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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1M-39

Tito's recent example in defying the Cominform is not likely to be emulated in the immediate future by the other Satellites. However, if Tito wins substantial concessions from the Kremlin or is successful in breaking away from Kremlin control, the "internationalist" Communists in the Satellites will face greater obstacles in controlling the "nationalist" Communist elements (particularly in Bulgaria and Hungary) which are reportedly already rebelling against blind obedience to the Kremlin.

Tito's action will confront Bulgaria with a more immediate decision than any of the other eastern European nations except Albania, which is little more than a Yugoslav republic. Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have achieved close economic and military cooperation since the end of World War II. Moreover, both countries are involved in conflicting claims on Greece and Macedonia. Bulgarian Communist Premier Dimitov probably will not join Tito because: (1) his rivalry with Tito for leadership in the Balkan militancy against any rapprochement; (2) his long training in Moscow has convinced him of the danger of defying Communist Party discipline; and (3) his realization that the USSR could retaliate -- by force, if necessary -- effectively against Bulgaria. Thus, despite the encouragement which "nationalist" Communists in Bulgaria may receive if Tito is successful, Dimitov can be expected to continue to bow to the Kremlin line.

The leaders of the Romanian Communist Party, including Cominform delegates Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca, and Gheorghe Dej, are probably loyal to the Kremlin. Moreover, any defection by them would be virtually impossible because of the presence of Soviet troops in Rumania. In addition, the secret Soviet-Rumanian protocols, which give the USSR more extensive military and economic controls over Rumania than over any other Satellite, would make such personal defections useless.

As in Rumania, the Communist Parties in the other Satellites are too vulnerable to Soviet force to risk a break

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with the Kremlin at this time. Even in Hungary, where the struggle for control between the "nation lists" and "internationalists" is reportedly still in the balance, the USSR can through its occupation forces presumably keep the situation under control.

A. E. HILLBROWSTER
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